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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Despite historical tensions between the Dominican Republic
and Haiti, Dominicans appear to have put aside their
resentment in favor of supporting Haitians after the
earthquake that devastated the neighbor nation in January
2010. Over the past several months, there has been
unprecedented cooperation between the Dominican Republic
and Haiti, with little evidence of a negative impact on
domestic politics in the Dominican Republic. In fact, the
high ratings of President Leonel Fernández and the results of
the May Parliamentary elections may suggest that how the
Fernández administration handled the Haitian crisis did not
have a negative impact on citizens’ perception. However, the
issue of Haitian immigration remains very sensitive in the
Dominican Republic, and has the potential to become the
major concern on the domestic political front. As of June
2010, the Haitian crisis seemed to have little or no impact on
Dominican politics, as the following points indicate:







The May 16, 2010 Parliamentary elections increased
President Fernández’s political party to 31 out of 32
Senate seats, and 105 out of 183 Chamber of
Deputies seats; this is a total increase of 18 seats
from the previous term.
Polls indicate that President Fernández has a 54
percent approval rating.
Polls also indicate that Haiti is not among the most
pressing issues of concern to Dominican citizens.
Instead, 65 percent of the population identifies drug
trafficking and corruption as the greatest concerns.
The immigration debate will remain the major
consideration in domestic politics in the Dominican
Republic; 62.4 percent of Dominicans polled think
that the military should be strengthened along the
DR-Haitian border.
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INTRODUCTION
The historically tense relationship between the Dominican
Republic and Haiti raised questions as to whether or not the
crisis stemming from the January 11, 2010 earthquake in
Port-au-Prince has stressed the political climate in the
Dominican Republic. The short answer is no, at least not yet.
Instead, Dominican society appears unsettled by the
destruction, to the extent that Dominicans have put aside
their feelings, for the time being, to support Haitians in
recovering from this disaster.1 In fact, the crisis may have
helped the current leadership to redirect some attention from
other domestic pressures affecting the country, such as
increasing crime and high unemployment. Polls released by
“Iberobarometer” in June 2010 suggest that Dominican
President Leonel Fernández has a 54 percent domestic
approval rating; this is perhaps an indication of society’s
support of his handling of the crisis in Haiti.2 The manner in
which the President’s political party swept the May
Parliamentary elections indicates no major shift in the
people’s preference of political party or elected government
officials. That is not to say that Dominicans have completely
let go of traditional concerns about Haiti, but rather, at this
moment, they have accepted the humanitarian needs and
continue to support of their government’s policy. Still, some
visible trends have emerged in the Dominican Republic that
are associated with the crisis in Haiti. These trends could
1

John Burnett, "For Haiti, Some Neighborly Help from Next Door,"
National Public Radio, January 2010; and Garry Pierre-Pierre, "HatianDominican Relations Warming After Quake," April 2010.
2
Iberoamerican Consortium of Business Marketing Research and
Consulting (CIMA) has published its annual study The Iberoamerican
Governability Barometer, or “Iberobarometer,” benchmarking the
institutionalization of democratic processes in Latin America and the
Iberian Peninsula. The School of International and Public Affairs at
Florida International University presented the findings of the 2010 report
on June 8, 2010.
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impact domestic politics for Dominicans in the years to
come, and could exacerbate some of the traditional sources
of tension between the two countries, such as immigration.
EVOLUTION OF DR-HAITIAN RELATIONS
Dominican-Haitian relations have been contentious as far
back as the immediate post-colonial era. After a series of
Haitian invasions with the objective of unifying the island of
Hispaniola under Haitian rule during the early to mid-1800s,
the Dominican Republic became the only former colony in
the Western Hemisphere to reintegrate itself with Spain—
though this reintegration was short lived. Nonetheless, this
lends itself to the origins of how Dominicans perceive
Haitians as a threat to the sovereignty and stability of the
Dominican Republic—a perception that persists in
Dominican society today.
Current Dominican perceptions of Haitians were not
institutionalized within the Dominican political system until
the forty-year regime of Dictator General Rafael Trujillo in
the twentieth century. While the “Era of Trujillo” for
Dominicans was a time of economic and social growth, and
of dictatorial repression, for Haitians living in the Dominican
Republic, it became one of ethnic cleansing. Trujillo
incorporated the racism in Dominican society into the
national political system. He preached Dominican racial and
social superiority over the Haitians while simultaneously
intensifying the race-based class divide among Dominicans.
Resentment toward Haitians became so great that Trujillo
used the Dominican Army in a campaign to expel Haitians
from the country. It culminated with the infamous Parsley
Massacre, in which roughly 30,000 Haitian civilians were
murdered by the Dominican Army in October 1937. Thus,

3

hostility to Haitians is rooted in Dominican history, and is
prevalent in its socio-cultural norms.3
After the collapse of the Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier
regime in 1986 and the subsequent weak governments that
have since followed, Dominicans began to view the Haitian
threat as social in nature. In other words, while there was no
Haitian State capable of threatening the sovereignty of the
Dominican Republic, Haitian instability created a new threat,
as Dominicans feared that Haitian migrants and refugees
would attempt to assimilate Dominican society to mirror that
of Haiti. As Mireya Navarro writes:
Privately, many Dominicans speak of
Haitians with both pity and disdain,
stereotyping them as carriers of disease and
practitioners of witchcraft [,] and blaming
them for ‘blackening’ their side of the island,
where the lighter-skinned population is mostly
mulatto.4
Furthermore, Dominicans feared that Haitians would be a
drain on Dominican resources, given Haiti’s inability to
provide even the most basic services to its citizens. Even
after the disaster in Haiti, Dominicans worry that Haitians

3

Nancy San Martin, "Hatians Crossing into the Dominican Republic
Seeking Jobs are Finding Abuse Instead," The Miami Herald, July 19,
2001, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/dominican/haitians-dr.htm;
and Clare M. Ribando, "Dominican Republic: Political and Economic
Conditions and Relations with the United States," CRS Report for
Congres,. March 8, 2005,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/46402.pdf.
4
Mireya Navarro, "At Last in Hispaniola, Hands Across the Border,"
Webster University, July 11, 1999. Mireya is now a journalist with the
New York Times focusing on race in Hispanic societies.

4

would be a burden on Dominican health services and exhaust
food resources “that should go to Dominicans.”5
In response to the lack of stability in Haiti and the fear of
Haitians integrating into Dominican society, recent
Dominican administrations (beginning with President Leonel
Fernández’s first term in 1996) have sought to address this
concern by aiding in the stability of Haiti through improved
relations in the areas of joint infrastructure and economic
development. In 1996, President Fernández created a
bilateral commission to facilitate dialogue on trade,
immigration and tourism. Despite the efforts by the
Dominicans to improve DR-Haiti relations, Dr. Johanna
Mendelson-Forman argues that it was the recent earthquake
that provided an opportunity to forge closer, more
substantive ties between the two countries.6 Since the
earthquake, both the Dominican and Haitian leadership have
engaged in unprecedented cooperation. The earthquake made
it imperative for the Haitian government to respond to
overtures by the Dominicans, and the Dominican
government has so far seized the opportunity to make the
most of this cooperation.
THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC POST DISASTER
The Dominican Republic’s response to the disaster was and
has been perceived in a very positive manner by both its
citizens and the international community.7 Immediately
5

Daniel Roth, "Tension Grows in the Border with Dominican Republic
as Hatians Try to Escape," The Miami Herald, January 16, 2010,
http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/01/16/1428997/tension-grows-in-theborder-with.html.
6
Interview with Johanna Mendelson Forman of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. on June 3, 2010.
7
"Enemies: A Love Story," Newsweek, April 5, 2010,
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/14/enemies-a-love-story.html.
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following the earthquake, Haitian President René Préval was
flown to the Dominican Republic in order to communicate
with the international community, and President Fernández
was the first head of state to visit Haiti following the
disaster. Paying little attention to historical tension, but with
an eye on immigration concerns, the Dominican Republic
was the first country to provide relief to Haiti immediately
following the earthquake.8 The Dominican Republic opened
its seaports and airports to facilitate and act as a staging
ground for the delivery of international aid to Haiti, and
Dominican authorities have demonstrated little tolerance for
those in the country attempting to hoard aid going into
Haiti.9 Although a sensitive issue, the Dominican Republic
has also provided healthcare to Haitians along the border.
Despite the outpouring of support by the Dominican
Republic, the immediate concern for most Dominicans was
the threat of a major exodus of refugees into the Dominican
Republic, and the immediate provision of relief supplies to
Haiti. An initial offer by the Dominican government to the
United Nations to deploy an estimated 150 to 800 Dominican
soldiers under the command of MINUSTAH was reluctantly
accepted by Haiti. The Dominican forces were integrated
into the “Peruvian contingent of MINUSTAH, stationed
along the Haiti side of the 370 kilometer-long border.”10
According to The Miami Herald, heavily armed Dominican
soldiers were positioned along Highway 46, the primary road
8

"Dominican Republic Aid to Haiti Eases Historic Tensions," CNN, 13
January 2010,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/01/13/haiti.earthquake.do
minican.republic/index.html.
9
"Enemies: A Love Story."
10
"Dominican Troops to Deploy in Haiti Despite Concerns,"
DominicanToday.com, February 5, 2010,
http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2010/2/4/34715/Dominicantroops-to-deploy-in-Haiti-despite-concerns.
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connecting Haiti and the Dominican Republic, in order to
ensure Haitians stayed on their side of the island.11 Despite
the presence of Dominican forces some media reports
suggest Haitians have been able to cross the border into the
Dominican Republic.12 However, a mass exodus has yet to
occur, and this is the main reason the crisis in Haiti has not
negatively impacted politics in the Dominican Republic.
INDICATORS OF THE IMPACT OF THE HAITI CRISIS
ON DOMINICAN POLITICS
On May 16, 2010, the Dominican Republic held
parliamentary elections for its Senate and Chamber of
Deputies. The Dominican Liberation Party (referred to by the
Spanish acronym PLD), the party of President Fernández,
increased its parliamentary majority by winning 31 of 32
Senate seats, and 105 of 183 Chamber of Deputies seats. The
overwhelming electoral success of the PLD can be
considered an indirect referendum on the Fernández
Administration’s post-earthquake Haitian initiatives. Some
also attribute the success of the PLD to the lack of
organization and unpopularity of opposition parties in the
Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, the clear mandate of the
PLD reflects some degree of voter contentment with the
PLD. The lack of debate during the elections over the
country’s role in assisting Haiti’s recovery effort was a result
of the less-than-expected effects on the Dominican Republic.
According to Dr. Eduardo Gamarra, Professor of Political
Science at Florida International University, the PLD’s
success was evidence of the small disapproval by the
electorate with the government’s disaster limitation and
recovery policies; he believes the opposite would have
severely limited the PLD’s prospects for success.
11

Roth, "Tension Grows in the Border with Dominican Republic as
Hatians Try to Escape."
12
Ibid.
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Recent polling conducted in the Dominican Republic by the
“Iberobarometer” project suggests that the crisis in Haiti is
not among the top concerns on the minds of Dominicans;
accordingly, drug trafficking and corruption are the major
domestic issues, and account for 65 percent of those
polled—46.6 and 18.3 percent, respectively. 13 Dominicans
also appear content with President Fernández. In the same
polling project, 54 percent approved of President Fernández;
52 percent think he has done a very good job with foreign
relations; and 55 percent think he has done a very good job
with neighboring countries, particularly Haiti.
Although President Fernández’s popularity still remains
positive after his handling of the earthquake in Haiti,
concerns among Dominicans remain with regard to assisting
the Haitian recovery effort. Nearly 60 percent of Dominicans
polled felt that the Dominican Republic helped Haiti beyond
the means of the DR, while, in a separate question, 23.7
percent believe that no more aid should go to Haiti. The
polling results also suggest that the top issue with respect to
the crisis in Haiti could very well center on immigration. In
December 2009, the Dominican Congress paved the way for
a constitutional amendment aimed at repatriating 800,000
Dominican residents of Haitian origins to include children
born to illegal immigrants.14 Although the Dominican
Republic eased its immigration policies for some requiring
medical attention, 84.9 percent of Dominicans polled by
“Iberobarometer” thought that the government should not
grant Haitians temporary legal status, while 79.7 percent felt
the government should not repatriate undocumented Haitians
13

The results of the “Iberobarometer” project were discussed in an
interview with Eduardo Gamarra prior to the official release on June 8,
2010. The interview was held on May 17, 2010.
14
Fred Grimm, "A Look at a Dominican Republic," The Miami Herald,
January 26, 2010. In an interview with Johanna Medelson Forman of the
Center for the Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington,
D.C.
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and earthquake victims. The polling data suggests that
although an overwhelming majority of Dominicans do not
want to grant Haitians temporary legal status, the majority
remains apprehensive about repatriating Haitians and
earthquake victims under the current crisis. Dominicans do
not want Haitians immigrating to the Dominican Republic
under other circumstances, given that 62.4 percent believes
that the military should be strengthened along the DR-Haiti
border. According to Gamarra, the results of the
“Iberobarometer” project suggest that, while immigration
remains the concern among Dominicans, its impact on
domestic politics is minimal at best, and at least for now will
not result in shifts in the current political landscape.15

15

Interview with Eduardo Gamarra, Professor of Political Science at
Florida International University and DR Special Envoy to Haiti on June
7, 2010.
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CONCLUSION
While the crisis in Haiti has not been a major strain on
domestic politics in the Dominican Republic, immigration
will emerge as a national issue as the number of Haitians in
the DR drastically increases and the sympathy of
Dominicans over the disaster wanes. Some Dominicans are
already taking notice of the increased visibility of Haitians in
urban sprawls like Santo Domingo. 16 Combined with high
unemployment rates, crime, and the burden on government
services, increased numbers of immigrants coming across the
DR-Haiti border (exacerbated by the disaster in Haiti) will
become a major issue on the national agenda. According to
Dominican Army Colonel Frank Mauricio Cabrera Rizek of
the Dominican Ministry of the Armed Forces, as the aid to
Haiti gradually decreases, more and more Haitians will
attempt to leave; many of them will choose to go to the
Dominican Republic for better opportunities and basic
needs.17 Another consideration affecting immigration from
Haiti to the Dominican Republic is the threat of a major
storm during the 2010 hurricane season. According to the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
the 2010 season could experience between 14 and 24 storms
in the Atlantic and Caribbean.18 Given that most of the
infrastructure in Haiti was destroyed by the earthquake, a
major storm could trigger a mass exodus into the Dominican
Republic and create a conflict between Haitians and
Dominicans over relief supplies. An event like this would
certainly put pressure on the Dominican government to
16

Interview with Coronel Frank Mauricio Cabrera Rizek, Deputy
Director of Plans and Operations in the Ministry of Armed Forces and
Advisor to the Security and Defense Commission of the Senate on May
26, 2010.
17
Ibid.
18
“State of the Climate Annual 2010,” NOAA, National Climatic
Data Center, 2010, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/2010/13.
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respond. Colonel Cabrera Rizek and others argue that, over
time during this period of crisis, the current tolerance of
Haitians by Dominicans could produce a significantly larger
Haitian community in the Dominican Republic, and create a
clash on the domestic political front in the future.
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